Abstract. Structure-preserving signatures are signatures whose public keys, messages, and signatures are all group elements in bilinear groups, and the verification is done by evaluating pairing product equations. It is known that any structure-preserving signature in the asymmetric bilinear group setting must include at least 3 group elements per signature and a matching construction exists.
Introduction

Background
When messages, signatures, and verification keys are elements of bilinear groups and the signature verification is done by evaluating pairing product equations, a signature scheme is called structure-preserving [2] . A structure-preserving signature (SPS for short) blends well with the Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof system [24] , and enables the construction of efficient cryptographic protocols such as round-optimal blind signatures [4, 2] , traceable signatures [1] , group encryption [10] , proxy signatures [2] , and delegatable credential systems [17] .
The first SPS was presented in [23] as a feasibility result. A variation of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme [9] introduced in [22] is an SPS that is secure against random message attacks. Schemes in [10] and [16] are efficient when signing a single group element, but their signature size grows linearly in the size of the message. The scheme in [16] is called automorphic as the message space includes its own public key, which is a useful feature in many applications. [2] presented the first constant-size SPS whose signature consists of 7 group elements. Yet shorter signatures have been pursued since then, however, [3] proved that any secure SPS in asymmetric bilinear groups requires at least 3 group elements. They presented a scheme matching the lower bound.
The 3-element SPS in [3] is based on a strong interactive assumption. They also constructed a 4-element SPS with a restricted message space based on a noninteractive assumption. It has been left as an open problem to find an optimal SPS based on a non-interactive assumption.
Black-Box Separations
A fully black-box reduction from a primitive B to a cryptographic scheme A is an algorithm R such that for any instance f of B and for any adversary E against A, if E breaks A f then R f,E breaks f . A black-box separation is to show the absence of such an algorithm R. While there are number of non-blackbox techniques, e.g., [5] , black-box separations are meaningful as a convincing indication of the hardness of finding a reduction and as a guide to find a way to get around it. For variations and more discussion we refer to [33] .
Oracle separation and meta-reduction are widely used techniques in showing a separation. Oracle separation is useful in showing the difficulty of constructing a cryptographic scheme from a minimal primitive such as a one-way function. Since black-box reductions relativise, showing the existence of an oracle that is useful in breaking A but useless in breaking B implies absence of black-box reductions from B to A. Since the seminal work by Impagliazzo and Rudich [26] , numerous results have been found using this approach. In most cases, primitives are simple cryptographic objects such as one-way functions, and the schemes in question are non-interactive ones such as collision-free hash function [34] or signature schemes [20, 14, 13] . A recent work in [27] addresses more involved interactive schemes, blind signatures, by extending this line of techniques.
In the Meta-reduction approach, initiated by [7, 11] , the proof of separation is done by constructing an algorithm, a so-called meta-reduction, that uses a reduction as a black-box and solves a targeted problem, which can be the same as or different from the primitive the reduction is supposed to break. The intuition is that if a reduction is successful, the reduction breaks the underlying primitive by itself without help from the adversary. Proofs for separation exploits strong properties of the target schemes and underlying primitives. [15] exploits the blindness property in constructing a meta-reduction separating three-move blind signatures from non-interactive assumptions. In [32] a class of protocols, constant-round sequentially witness-hiding special-sound protocols for unique witness relations, is separated from any standard assumptions. It includes some practically important protocols such as Schnorr identification schemes.
Separation is often considered for limited classes of reductions. [31] assumes a key-preserving property where the same RSA moduli are used in all oracle calls. Later in [29] an assumption so-called instance non-malleability is introduced to ease the limitation. A variation in prime-order groups appears in [28] . In [7, 11, 30, 8, 19] , a class of algorithms called algebraic reductions is considered. In this class, yielding a new group element is limited so that it is possible to extract its representation for relevant bases. As claimed in [7] , the class of algebraic reductions are not overly restrictive. In particular, for prime order groups, all known efficient reductions fall into this class to the best of our knowledge.
Our Contribution
This paper shows that no algebraic reduction falls short in proving existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks of 3-element SPS in type-III bilinear groups [18] based on any non-interactive assumption. This gives a partial justification for the existing 3-element schemes with interactive assumptions since algebraic algorithms, while covering all known reduction algorithms in prime order groups, are not powerful enough to prove the security of a 3-element SPS.
Our separation follows the meta-reduction paradigm. However, instead of showing a monolithic proof that constructs a meta-reduction from scratch, we present a handy characterization that separates a signature scheme from any non-interactive assumptions. It facilitates the proofs, in particular when the reductions are restricted to a class of algorithms where knowledge extraction is given for free. The intuition behind our characterization is that if the signature scheme in question forces a reduction algorithm to know some information, e.g., the signing-key itself, to simulate the signing oracle in the euf-cma game, and this information is so essential that the adversary wins the game by seeing it, then the reduction algorithm can break the assumption without help from the adversary. Given the characterization, we show that such crucial information exists in any 3-element SPS when the reduction algorithm is algebraic. This gives us our separation from non-interactive assumptions.
Preliminaries
Digital Signature Scheme
We consider signature schemes that works over a set of common parameters, say GK . Concretely, there is a generator of the common parameters and the key generation algorithm takes GK as input. Such an extended formulation is often used in practical cryptographic protocols where many users share the group for efficiency reasons. We use the standard notion of existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks (euf-cma) [21] formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Digital Signature Scheme). A digital signature scheme Sig is a set of efficient algorithms (C, K, S, V). C is the common
Definition 2 (euf-cma).
A signature scheme Sig = (C, K, S, V) is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks if, for any A ∈ PPT, the probability 
Bilinear Groups
In this paper, let G be a generator of bilinear groups. It takes security parameter 1 λ as input and outputs Λ :
-p is a λ-bit prime, -G 1 , G 2 , G T are groups of prime order p with efficiently computable group operations, membership tests, and bilinear mapping e :
By generic operations, we mean the group operation, membership testing, and bilinear mapping over the groups in Λ. In Type-III groups [18] , no efficient isomorphisms are provided for either directions between G 1 and G 
Structure Preserving Signatures
For a description of bilinear groups Λ = (p, In a narrow sense, SPS might be limited to Z = 1 and VK excluding elements in G T so that accompanying witness-indistinguishable Groth-Sahai proofs can have the zero-knowledge property.
Algebraic Algorithms
An algorithm is called algebraic with respect to a group if it takes a vector of elements X in the group and outputs a group element Y and there is a corresponding algorithm called an extractor that can output the representation of Y with respect to X. For instance, if the algebraic algorithm R takes A, B ∈ G * as input and outputs C ∈ G * , then R's extractor E outputs (a, b) such that C = A a B b . In the following, we give a formal definition of the minimal case where an algorithm takes group elements from one group as input and outputs only one group element.
Definition 4 (Algebraic Algorithm). Let R be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that takes Λ, a string aux ∈ {0, 1}
* , and group elements X ∈ G 
and all polynomial size X and aux , the following probability is negligible in λ.
Please note that unlike the case of the knowledge of exponent assumptions [12, 25, 6 ] that assumes the presence of E for any malicious R, here we try to capture the limitation of current technology in building reduction algorithms. It is in fact easy to imagine an algorithm R that may not be algebraic as defined above; R takes a string from aux and directly translates it as a group element in G * . For such R there may not be an efficient extractor E. However, a reduction algorithm that chooses Y in this way will typically not be more useful than one that chooses Y with a known discrete logarithm with respect to X. Accordingly, we consider algorithms that compute on explicitly given group elements. We also stress that we are only interested in capturing the structure of Y with respect to the base X. It is possible that aux contains additional group elements and that R returns group elements in ext for which we do not care to know a representation with respect to X.
The above definition extends naturally to A that takes group elements from both groups and outputs multiple group elements at the same time. Furthermore, we note that algorithms that outputs no group elements can also be regarded as algebraic by taking the identity as default output for such algorithms so that extracting the representation is trivial. Trivial algorithms that output group elements taken from inputs intact are algebraic, too.
The notion is also extended to oracle algorithms.
denote an execution ofR accessing to oracle O where [X , aux ] denotes all inputs toR given from (all invocations of) O. We say that oracle algorithmR is algebraic if there exists an algebraic algorithm R, and the computation byR O is equivalent to the following sequence of computation. First set
y for X = X ∪ X . Such extractor can be constructed in straightforward manner by using the extractor for R.
By Cls alb we denote the set of all algebraic algorithms with respect to G.
Non-interactive Hardness Assumptions
Intuitively, an assumption states that there is no algorithm A that is better than any known (typically trivial) algorithm U , which, for example, selects its output uniformly from a proper domain. In fact, our formulation is so general that it can capture too strong assumptions that never hold and too weak ones that always hold. But it does not matter for our purpose since we are to show the impossibility to reduce the security of a signature scheme to such (extreme) assumptions.
Definition 5 (Non-interactive Hardness Assumptions).
A non-interactive problem consists of a triple of algorithms P = (I, V, U ) where I ∈ PPT is an instance generator, which takes 1 λ and outputs a pair of an instance and a witness, (y, w), and V is a verification algorithm that takes y, w and an answer x, and outputs 1 or 0 that represents acceptance or rejection, respectively. A non-interactive hardness assumption for problem P is to assume that, for any A ∈ PPT, the following advantage function Adv is negligible in λ.
In search problems, U is typically set to an algorithm that returns constant ⊥ (or a random answer x when the domain is uniformly sampleable). In decision problems, U typically returns 1 or 0 randomly so that the latter probability is 1/2. As we are concerned with structure preserving signatures, we consider hard problems that are defined over bilinear groups as follows.
Definition 6 (Hard Problem over G). A non-interactive problem P over bilinear group generator G is a non-interactive problem such that
, and output y includes Λ, and -there exists A that solves P with access to an oracle that solves the discrete logarithm problem for the groups in Λ.
By NIP, we denote all non-interactive problems. Similarly, NIP G denotes NIP over G. Throughout the paper, we simply say that algorithm A solves problem P if advantage Adv A (1 λ ) is not negligible.
Black-Box Reduction and Meta-Reduction
When algorithm R is given A as black-box, denoted by R A , we mean that R and A are given the same security parameter and A is given access to arbitrary number of copies of A as oracles. Interaction between R and A can be done in interleaving manner. If A is a randomized algorithm, A has random coins inside and every copy uses the same randomness. The security parameter and the random coins are out of the control of R.
For problem P and signature scheme Sig, R is a fully black-box reduction if, for any (even inefficient) successful forger A for Sig, R A is successful in solving P . By Sig ⇒ R P , we mean that R is a black-box reduction from Sig to P . A separation between Sig and P is to show that for Sig and P , there is no such R under hardness assumption for problem P . (The problem P can be the same as P to make the separation unconditional.) Note that R depends on Sig and P . To claim that a class of hardness assumption falls short of proving the security of any construction of a signature scheme in a class by any black-box reduction, one need to show the absence of R for every signature and assumption in the respective classes.
In the meta-reduction paradigm, a proof typically begin with constructing a magic adversary A that is inefficient (or given access to powerful oracle) but successful in breaking Sig so that R A works as expected. It then constructs metareduction M that M R solves P . A major task of M is to efficiently emulate A by rewinding R and/or exploiting special properties of R and Sig. If M is successful in the emulation, M R can be seen as a polynomial-time algorithm that solves P , which contradicts the assumed hardness of P .
Crucial Relation
If any algorithm that simulates signatures must "know" the secret key, the unforgeability of the signature scheme cannot be proven by black-box reduction to any non-interactive assumption. We extend this idea in such a way that it is not necessary to know the entire secret key but some crucial information is necessary to conduct the simulation and sufficient to forge a signature if leaked to the adversary. Informally, crucial information is a witness for a binary relation, Ψ (θ, ), which we call crucial relation defined over signatures θ and some sensitive information . The relation requires three properties: every θ has exactly one (uniqueness), whenever an entity is successful in producing signatures, it is possible to extract from the entity (extractability), and is useful enough to yield a forgery (usefulness). A crucial relation is defined with respect to a class of algorithms, Cls ⊆ PPT to which the entity that generates θ belongs.
Let us first prepare some notations used in the formal definition. For a public key VK , a sequence of messages M = {M 1 , . . . , M n } ∈ Msp n and signatures
is a crucial relation for Sig with respect to a class of algorithms Cls if the following properties are provided. 
is negligible in λ. The probability is taken over the choice of M and the randomness given to R. The same randomness is given to E. -(Usefulness) There exists an algorithm B ∈ PPT such that, for any θ := (VK , M , Σ) and that satisfies Ψ (θ, ) = 1, the following probability is not negligible in λ.
Remarks:
-The intuition of extractability is that whenever ϕ is helpful for R in computing valid signatures, extractor E should be successful in extracting from ϕ. This must hold even for non-legitimate VK as long as it is functional with respect to the verification. -For R that is successful only with negligible probability, E can be an empty algorithm. So we only need to care for successful R that yields valid signatures. In particular, conditioned that 1 = V(θ) happens with noticeable probability, the conditional provability that 1 = Ψ (θ, ) is overwhelming. -There may be many ϕ that make R produce the same Σ from the same VK and M . Whichever ϕ is given, E must output the same .
Let SIGCR Cls denote signature schemes that has a crucial relation for a class of algorithms, Cls. We require Cls be a class of algorithms in PPT that satisfies the following trivial composition. For any A ∈ Cls, the following A is also in Proof. Let O be a deterministic oracle that takes θ as input and returns that 1 = Ψ (θ, ) if it exists (otherwise return ⊥). Consider the following allpowerful adversary A attacking Sig with access to O. Let f be a pseudo-random function. Given VK as input, A selects a random key for f and checks if 1 ← TstVk (1 λ , VK ) (if not, A halts). Then it chooses M randomly from Msp n for some constant n by using pseudo-randomness generated by f (VK ). Let M ← Msp f (VK ) denote these steps. A then send M to the signing oracle (simulated by R). After receiving n signatures, Σ, A aborts if Σ contains an invalid signature.
Otherwise, A calls O with input θ = (VK , M , Σ) and obtains . It then executes (M, Σ) ← B(VK , M , Σ, ) and outputs (M, Σ).
To verify that above A O is indeed a successful forger, consider that A O is given legitimate VK and signatures generated by S(SK , M ). By correctness of Sig and the uniqueness property, indeed exist and is uniquely defined. So O returns . Then due to the usefulness property, the output from B satisfies the predicates with probability not negligible in λ. Thus A O is a successful forger against Sig.
Suppose that there exists R ∈ Cls that Sig ⇒ R P holds. Since R is a fully black-box reduction it must be successful with the above A O . Namely, Adv R A O (1 λ ) as defined in Definition 5 is not negligible. Without loss of generality, we assume that A outputs n messages as M at once. We also assume, without loss of generality, that when R outputs something for interaction it also outputs the internal state ϕ at that moment. Then R is restarted taking ϕ and some data from the interaction as input.
We construct meta-reduction M that M R solves P . M emulates A O without any oracles. By a session, we mean the conversation between R and a copy of A initiated by R with input VK i to A. Every session is labelled by an index. Given y ← I(1 λ ), M sets ϕ 0 := y. Let BADSIG[i] be a flag that indicates the presence of an invalid signature in i-th session. It is initialized to zero. M runs R(ϕ 0 ) and do as follows.
-If R outputs (ϕ i , VK j ) to invoke j-th copy of A, M checks TstVk (1 λ , VK j ) and halt the session if it is not 1. Otherwise, M selects M j ←Msp n j (if the same VK j has been observed before, say in session k, M uses the same M k instead), and resume R as R(ϕ i ||M j ). Here Msp j is the message space associated to VK j .
It then continues as follows.
• If < n, M continues by running R(ϕ i ).
• If = n and BADSIG[k] = 0, then M extracts k for this session as follows. Let ϕ i be the internal state that R outputs with VK k . Let M k be the last message R is given before outputting Σ k,n . Let
. . , M k as input, and collects signatures Σ k,i for i = 1, . . . , n, and finally outputs Σ k . As R is in Cls, so is R as assumed to Cls. Due to the extractability property, there exists polynomial-time 
. Next replace extractor E with oracle O. Call this modified algorithm M . We show that the loss of advantage by moving from M to M is negligible. Let
denote the probability presented in (2). We replace Msp n j and E with Msp f and O accordingly with trivial meaning. With this notation, the loss of advantage is upper bound by
To evaluate the right hand of (4), first observe that
is negligible due to the indistinguishability of f . Also,
is negligible due to the extractability property. Finally observe that
is zero because oracle O never causes 1 = Ψ (θ, ) if 1 = V(θ) due to the uniqueness condition. Thus both probabilities in (7) are zero. Since (5) to (7) are all negligible, we conclude that (4) is negligible, too. Finally, observe that M is identical to A O . Accordingly, |Adv
Since R and E belongs to Cls ⊆ PPT and M only performs operations that can be done in polynomial-time, the total running time of M and R remains polynomial. Thus M R forms a polynomial-time algorithm that solves P , which contradicts to the assumed hardness of P .
Crucial Relation in Size-3 SPS
We consider the class of algebraic reductions that make oracle calls with keys formed over over the groups for which it is defined as algebraic. This constraint plays a role when we construct an extractor for crucial relation based on the extractor associated with the algebraic reduction. Since the extractor works only for the groups the algebraic reduction is defined, so does the resulting extractor for crucial relation. Since the crucial relation involves the verification keys, we require all keys to be generated over the same groups the extractor works for. We call such algorithms group-preserving algebraic reductions. This notion has been used before in the literature, e.g., [19] and the constraint also has some similarity to key-preservation [31] and instance non-malleability [29] .
Theorem 9. There exists no group-preserving algebraic reduction that reduces the existential unforgeability of an SPS scheme to hardness of any problem in NIP G if signatures consist of three base group elements.
We prove Theorem 9 actually by proving the following lemma. Then applying Theorem 8 completes the proof.
Lemma 10. Any SPS scheme with signature size 3 has a crucial relation with respect to group-preserving algebraic algorithms.
We begin by recalling the result from [3] that any SPS scheme whose verification consists of one pairing product equation, or whose signature consists only of G 1 or G 2 is not euf-cma. A signature scheme for signing multiple elements at once can always be used to sign a single element by setting the other group elements to 1. Without loss of generality, it therefore suffices to consider schemes whose message consists of a single group element and where the signature consists of 2 elements in one group and 1 element in the other. We will also consider, without loss of generality, the case where the verification consists of two pairing product equations. The result applies to schemes with more than two verification equations as well and the proofs can be adopted with superficial changes.
Case of
In any SPS whose signature consists of 3 group elements, (R, S, T ) ∈ G 2 1 × G 2 , the verification predicate includes at least two pairing product equations that can be reduced to the following general form.
The group elements except for M, R, S and T are taken from the public key, and the constants in Z p are taken from the common parameters. For a message M and a signature (R, S, T ), let ϕ r , α r , ϕ s , α s , and t be
We consider ϕ r , α r , ϕ s , α s be variables that fulfill relations determined by (8) , (9) and (10) . Let f 1 and f 2 be
where small-case letters, r, s, and m, represents the discrete-logs (to base G) of group elements denoted by corresponding large-case letters. (This convention is used throughout this paper.) By replacing R and S in (8) with those in (10) and taking the discrete-logs with respect to base e(G, H), we can represent (8) as f 3 m + f 4 = 0 where
Similarly, (9) can be represented as f 5 m + f 6 = 0 where
Consider a system of equations Q := {f 1 = 0, . . . , f 6 = 0}. Focus on a nonredundant part, e.g.,
Let K t denote the leftmost matrix in (16) . It has rank 4, and
If det(K t ) = 0, there exists unique (α r , α s , ϕ r , ϕ s ) that fulfills Q. Note that Q is defined with respect to the public key and M and T .
Crucial Relation. Now we are ready to define a crucial relation as follows.
fulfills Q w.r.t. VK and M , and -(M, R, S, T ) is the first one in θ that det(K t ) = 0.
Relation Ψ also returns 1 if det(K t ) = 0 for all (M, R, S, T ) in θ and = ⊥. Note that the second condition implies R = G ϕr M αr , S = G ϕs M αs . Such is extractable, unique, and useful as shown below.
Uniqueness. The first (M, Σ) with det(K t ) = 0 is unique in θ (assuming that signatures are stored in order) if it exists. Then, is uniquely determined for such (M, Σ) from relation (16) . When there is no (M, σ) with det(K t ) = 0 exists in θ, is also uniquely defined to ⊥. Accordingly, for any θ, there is unique such that Ψ (θ, ) = 1.
Usefulness. Given that satisfies Ψ (θ, ) = 1, a valid signature for arbitrary message can be created as follows. We first consider the case where
. To see that Σ = (R , S , T ) is a valid signature for M , observe that the first verification predicate (8) is
It results in 1 since satisfies f 3 = f 4 = 0. The second predicate can be verified in the same way. Thus, by choosing fresh M , (R , S , T ) is a successful forgery. We next consider the case of = ⊥. It means that det(K t ) = 0 holds for all M and (R, S, T ) in θ. We then present a concrete attack as follows. First we consider the case where (17) is not a zero polynomial. Since (17) is quadratic in t, there are at most two T s for which det(K t ) = 0. Given θ including more than three signatures, such T must appear more than once. Given two signa- 
which are defined to zero if any of a 1 , a 2 , u 1 or u 2 is zero. Then, from f 3 = f 5 = 0 in (12) and (14), we have
The coefficient of α s in (19) is zero since det(K t ) = 0. Thus we have
Since (20) holds for any t, we have
Similarly, from f 4 = f 6 = 0 in (13) and (15), we have
From (18), (21) and (22), the second verification predicate (9) is
and the first verification predicate (8) is 
2 ) for randomly chosen β 1 and β 2 that satisfies β 1 +β 2 = 1. Then (M , R , S , T 1 ) is a valid fresh signature. Keeping the condition on T 1 and T 2 in mind, inspection is not hard and omitted. This concludes that a successful forgery is possible even for the case of = ⊥.
Extractability. Observe that, for any algebraic algorithm that obtains M as input and computes group element R, there exists an extractor that outputs α r such that R = (G ϕr )M αr where (G ϕr ) part is computed by multi-base exponentiation of group elements except for M . Similarly, the extractor outputs
fulfills f 1 and f 2 . We then claim that f i = 0 for i = 3, . . . , 6 also hold except for negligible probability. Otherwise, the algorithm can be used to solve the discrete-logarithm problem between G and M . As we can manipulate all group elements given to the algorithm so that all their discrete-logarithms are known except for M , we can compute ϕ r (and ϕ s ) from the extracted exponents. Suppose that, without loss of generality, f 3 (α 1 , α 2 , G ϕ1 , G ϕ2 , H t ) fulfills Q t with overwhelming probability assuming the hardness of the discrete-logarithm problem in G 1 .
Since we can extract (α 1 , α 2 , G ϕ1 , G ϕ2 , H t ) for all M and (R, S, T ) in θ, a question is how to find the first one with det(K t ) = 0 if it exists. It is done as follows. Suppose that θ includes more than six valid signatures, say (R i , S i , T i ) for M i for i = 1, . . . , q. Given corresponding α ri and α si that satisfies f 1 = 0 and f 2 = 0 from (12) and (13), one can solve the equations to obtain (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , v 1 , v 2 , v 3 ) and every t i . Observe that, when (12) and (14) are to be zero, we can represent α ri and α si by
If det(K ti ) = 0, pair (α ri , α si ) is unique to t i . By using the extracted (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ,  v 1 , v 2 , v 3 ) and t i in each signature, we can find the smallest index i * ∈ {1, . . . , q} at which det(K t i * ) = 0 with respect to (M i * , Σ i * ) ∈ M × Σ, and assign accordingly. If there is no such index, we set = ⊥. The success probability of the extraction is overwhelming since the probability of the extractor for the algebraic algorithm is overwhelming conditioned that given signatures are valid.
As well as the previous case, any SPS with signature (R, S, T ) ∈ G 1 × G 2 2 for message M ∈ G 1 verifies at least two pairing product equations that can be reduced to the following form.
Let R = G ϕr M αr . As before, we consider the relation in the exponent with respect to base e(G, H). Then (23) and (24) are transformed as follows.
Consider a system of equations Q := {f 1 = 0, . . . , f 5 = 0} where f i is defined as 
Note that, with the above definition, (25) and (26) In the following, we show that such is unique, useful and extractable. For any algebraic algorithm that outputs (R, S, T ) for given M , there exists an extractor that outputs α r such that R = G ϕr M αr for some ϕ r . As argued before, this α r fulfills Q except for negligible probability if the discrete-logarithm problem in G 1 is hard. Thus outputting = (α r , G ϕr , S, T ) completes the extraction.
Conclusion and Open Problems
Some ideas are suggested to get around our impossibility result. The first is to resort to interactive assumptions as done for constructing 3-element scheme in [3] . The second would be to go beyond the group-preserving algebraic reduction. It however needs a number theoretic breakthrough to exploit an adversary that works for a group with different prime order. More exotic approach is to find a non-blackbox reduction that uses the adversary in non-blackbox manner. It also needs a breakthrough technique to exploit the code of the adversary to handle number-theoretic object like bilinear groups. While this paper focused on particular type of bilinear groups due to its importance, it is of interest to see whether similar result is obtained in other settings. Since known 4-element schemes based on non-interactive assumptions only sign messages in either of the base groups but not both, it would be worth pursuing a 4-element scheme that signs group elements from both groups at the same time, or to show the impossibility.
